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Samuels: SMS Safety Culture

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA, 2020) describes a Safety
Management System (SMS) as a formal risk management approach intended to
assure safety risk control effectiveness. A successful SMS program is more than
just the sum of documented processes; it is predicated on the complex, unseen, and
perhaps even unwritten cultural climate that drives the organization. This
organizational environment can be difficult to quantify and tricky to formulate. It
is generally unique to the organization, and may be comprised of a set of norms,
values, philosophies, rules, habits (Choudhry et al., 2007), stories (Galloway,
2016), and even vocabularies (Duhigg, 2012). These characteristics combine to
form an organization’s identity and can often drive the organization’s conscious
and unconscious value system. An organizational culture of silence, for example,
may prevent employees from voicing their concerns, or may result in substantial
consequences to the careers of those who do speak up. For these reasons, an SMS
must be completely devoid of even the semblance of intimidation, and must
reinforce, every day, that safety is the organization’s first priority.
SMS
An organization’s SMS codifies the philosophical, procedural, and
technical framework which forms an organization’s ability to “understand,
construct, and manage proactive safety systems” (Stolzer & Goglia, 2017, p. 15). It
is comprised of four basic components: (1) Safety Policy, or the organization’s
documented commitment to safety; (2) Safety Risk Management, hazard
identification, assessment, and control; (3) Safety Assurance, monitoring risk
controls; and (4) Safety Promotion, development of an environment of institutional
knowledge capture and sharing, effective communication, and training (FAA,
2020). The SMS establishes policies and procedures which document the
organization’s commitment to safety, defines its safety objectives, and specifies the
roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities of personnel at all levels of the
organization (FAA, 2020). It also incorporates a closed-loop system that identifies,
analyzes, characterizes, assesses, controls, and tracks risk, consistently measuring
and monitoring performance. The system further assures safety by collecting,
managing, and monitoring operational data, and investigating, auditing, and
assessing performance and implementing corrective actions, including those of
product and service providers. Finally, the system promotes safety through a
combination of training and communication, creating an environment conducive to
the safety objectives of the organization.
Bottani et al. (2009) studied the performance of SMS adopters and nonadopters by surveying 160 safety (36%), quality (16%), financial (16%), production
(11%), and logistics (7%) managers, as well as other business functions (14%) in
116 companies. The researchers asked general questions about the employer,
followed by questions about accidents occurring within their organizations and root
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causes, and ending with questions weighing company performance against the
benefits expected through adoption of an SMS. Responses revealed companies
adopting an SMS suffer substantially fewer accidents annually. They also perform
significantly better in assessments of the perceived importance the company
attaches to safety and how risks in the workplace are communicated to employees,
the attitude to update risk data and to assess risks, and the attitude to implement
employees training programs.
Safety Culture
Safety Culture is a broad term that came into existence in the 1980s
(Reason, 1997) and received particular attention following two fatal 1986
explosions: the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger and the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant reactor (Galloway, 2016). Reason (1997) defined Safety Culture as
meeting four criteria: (1) Reporting Culture, one where employees freely report
errors and near-misses; (2) Just Culture, a non-punitive, trusting environment,
where the system rather than the employee is held accountable for errors; (3)
Flexible Culture, where employees are so well-trained and where their skills,
experience, and abilities, are so well respected, that management is able to cede
control to front line experts under conditions of crisis; and (4) Learning Culture,
where the organization is able to draw the right conclusions and implement changes
as needed based on data from its safety information systems. Together, these
criteria create an Informed Culture, where managers and operators have full
awareness of all the factors that affect safety in a system. When it comes to SMS,
an Informed Culture is, essentially, a Safety Culture.
Gerede (2015) conducted a study on aircraft maintenance organizations in
Turkey to identify the challenges of effecting an SMS into practice. A two-day
workshop was held in the summer of 2012 with 52 SMS managers and specialists,
quality supervisors, and training managers, attending from 24 maintenance
organizations and the Turkish Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA). The
“top 3” challenges of putting SMS into practice were identified as: (1) a failure to
create a Just Culture, (2) a fear of punishment that impairs reporting, and (3) a
punishment culture by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) which hinders voluntary
reporting. The importance of developing a Just Culture is a key takeaway from
Gerede’s study, as its absence “feeds a culture of fear and impairs both the proactive
and predictive components of the SMS” (Gerede, 2015, p. 111). An environment
of blame, with “no distinction between human error and violations” (Gerede, 2015,
p. 111) is antithesis to learning from mistakes and ensuring an organization’s
continuous improvement.
Safety Culture requires a trusting environment, where sharing and learning
are valued and rewarded. Such an environment provides Psychological Safety, a
necessary precondition for continued success. Psychological Safety is defined as “a
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shared belief held by members of a team that the team is safe for interpersonal risk
taking” (Edmondson, 1999, p. 350). When beginning any teamwork activity,
people automatically assess their environment to determine their expected
repercussions of risk-taking (Roussin et al., 2018). If they feel safe, they will openly
participate, reflect, and learn or discuss. If they feel unsafe, they will shut down or
withdraw. This safety climate is highly correlated to the level of trust employees
have in their coworkers and management (Avram et al., 2014). “Safe behavior rises
and falls in tandem with a set of variables that relates specifically to workplace
culture and that mutual trust among participating individuals forms the foundation
on which any culture develops” (Dawson, 2002). Not only does trust in supervisors
and colleagues influence compliance with safety procedures, but it is also required
if an organization is to expect employees to report mistakes and errors in safety
procedures, so safety can be honestly monitored and continuously improved
(Roussin, 2018).
Attentive and engaged management also contributes to a reciprocal culture
of communication and trust. A 1920s study of Western Electric Company’s
Hawthorne facilities began as a study to understand the importance of lighting on
productivity. Instead, the study uncovered that productivity improved simply due
to the observation itself (Minter, 2013). Referring to the Hawthorne study, Florczak
(2003) suggested that when management created an environment that gave
individuals attention, workers felt valued and became more motivated and attentive.
He concludes the management attentiveness necessarily also made for safer
employees, who were more open to following management’s safety practices and
more engaged in the process. Regular check-ins keep employees attentive and
motivated, and thus also safer, and more likely to bring up problems or suggestions.
One of the best examples of the value of instituting a Safety Culture in an
organization took place in the late 1980s. Paul O’Neill was a newly hired CEO,
brought on board to lead a transformation at Aluminum Company of America, a
failing international aluminum manufacturing conglomerate known colloquially as
Alcoa (Duhigg, 2012). O’Neill intuitively understood that safety would be both a
driver for change and a metric for success. By focusing on safety, O’Neill was able
to effect other changes that rippled through his organization, creating an
environment that encouraged employees to propose suggestions for improved
processes, and even to shut down a production line if they became overwhelmed.
By creating a Safety Culture that permeated his entire organization, O’Neill’s
leadership created an environment that encouraged employees to speak up when
they observed safety concerns. As a result, Alcoa dramatically reduced costs,
improved product quality, and increased productivity. As Alcoa’s success story
illustrates, safety systems that welcome employee feedback can have dramatic
effects on the business by increasing employee engagement and productivity,
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reducing operational costs, boosting safety ratings (when applicable), and
improving the customer experience.
Principled Dissent
Graham (1983) defined Principled Organizational Dissent as a “protest
and/or effort to change the organizational status quo because of a conscientious
objection to current policy or practice” (Graham, 1983, p. iv). There is evidence
that Principled Dissent enhances workplace safety, and that, conversely, one of the
greatest risks to employee safety is the employer who attempts to silence its
employees (“Dissent Boosts,” 2013). Suppressing dissent creates a toxic and
unprincipled environment that suffers from preventable mistakes (Shahinpoor &
Matt, 2007) and therefore risks employee safety (Rebbitt, 2013). Hierarchical
organizations tend to be particularly destructive because they do not value or
approve of creativity nor dissent (Shahinpoor & Matt, 2007), while organizations
with matrix reporting structures tend to embrace dissent and have better safety
performance metrics (Rebbitt, 2013). Regardless of size or reporting structure, how
an organization responds when safety concerns threaten cost or schedule (Kassing,
2011) sends a strong signal to employees about whether principled dissent will be
respected or even tolerated.
There are examples of organizations that deliberately create an environment
that not only makes it easier for concerned employees to speak up—they make it
an obligation (Scott, 2017b). Apple’s Steve Jobs was a master at coaxing
employees to argue their position. In her book, Scott (2017a) recounts a colleague’s
experience arguing with Jobs about an idea, and it later turned out that her colleague
was right. Rather than apologizing for his mistake, Jobs marched into the
employee’s office and started yelling: “It was your job to convince me I was wrong,
and you failed!” After that, the employee argued his position until one of them had
convinced the other. Jobs’ unconventional approach would later prompt Andy
Grove, CEO of Intel to bark in frustration, “Steve ALWAYS gets it right!” When
employees feel an obligation to get it right, they feel free to voice their dissent. The
result is typically a better outcome in the long term, even when concerns threaten
short term cost margins or schedules.
The Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) grants extraordinary power to
any member of the community, who may express dissent at any meeting simply by
declaring: “I am unable to unite with the proposal” (Shahinpoor & Matt, 2007, p.
46). In doing so, the member automatically stops the action that has been agreed
upon by the rest of the group and forces the community to continue deliberations
on the proposed topic at hand. Quaker business customs were “deliberately
designed to maintain unity while allowing the utmost possible tolerance for
individual views” (Pollard et al., 1949, p. 55). The dissenter is given this authority
because it is assumed that she or he is expressing “profound matters of conscience”
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(Shahinpoor & Matt, 2007, p. 46). This custom signals to all the members present
that the community is expressing their conscience, and that the dissenter is no
different than the group, all of whom share an environment in which everyone is
simply seeking the truth. An additional benefit of the practice is that it helps the
community avoid the pitfalls of Groupthink, defined as “a mode of thinking that
people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the
members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise
alternative courses of action” (Janis, 1972, p. 9). Groups that find themselves in this
mode of “extreme concurrence seeking” (Turner et al., 2014, p. 118) would do well
to establish an environment where any member has the authority to refocus
deliberations or question assumptions in pursuit of the truth.
There are plenty of examples where employees expressed Principled
Dissent, only to find their careers ruined as a result. In 2010, star sugeon Dr. Paolo
Macchiarini was hired at the renowned Karolinska Institute in Stockholm, Sweden,
the same establishment that awards the Nobel Prize in Medicine. Dr. Macchiarini
began to partake in a series of groundbreaking surgeries that replaced patients’
windpipes with plastic stem cell-treated replacements (Fountain, 2014; Herold,
2018). The patients had been in stable condition pre-surgery, yet all eventually died
in horrific agony as a result of Macchiarini’s procedure. Rather than report the
results, as would be expected by medical ethics, the renowned surgeon continued
performing surgeries. Four whistleblowers took it upon themselves to study the
patients’ medical records and report their findings—that the patients had,
essentially, been mutilated—to the Institute’s President, Dr. Anders Hamsten. To
their surprise, Institute management, more concerned with a $45 million grant and
its own reputation, responded with intimidation and retaliation, systematically
discrediting the reputations of the whistleblowers and nearly ending their careers.
How an organization characterizes its own tolerance of Pricipled Dissent is perhaps
less important than how it actually responds when an employee disagrees with
company policy or business decisions (Kassing, 2011).
Conclusions and Recommendations
An SMS codifies an orgnaization’s commitment to safety, its risk
management and monitoring practices, and its ability to permeate and
operationalize its institutional knowledge thoughrought the organization. Entities
spend considerable resources building robust SMSs, indicating safety is clearly a
corporate value in which they are willing to invest. Yet where organizations often
fail is in neglecting to develop their Safety Culture. This includes a Reporting
Culture, a Just Culture, a Flexible Culture, and a Learning Culture. Together, these
form an Informed Culture. When Informed Culture is given a trusting environment
where Psychological Safety values and rewards sharing and learning, a culture of
safety can thrive. Perhaps most importantly, employees feel empowered to express
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discomfort with safety practices. When employees believe Principled Dissent is
not just expected but also their obligation, they can feel free to extract themselves
from the group dynamics or team cohesion that often result in Groupthink. These
expressions of Principled Dissent can have far-reaching effects on organizations,
party safety-critical organizations, including improved safety, quality, productivity,
employee engagement and retention, and customer satisfaction.
Building a strong Safety Culture is simply good business—therefore it is
beneficial for safety-critical organizations to understand how to to create an SMS
that encourages the voice of dissent. The following recommendations are aimed at
the leader who is building or re-evaluating an SMS, and who is committed to
creating an environment that encourages employees from every part of the
organization to speak up when they identify safety concerns.
Safety Policy
• As you develop policies and procedures, spell out your mechanisms for
enabling and encouraging reporting. Ensure employees from every part of
the organization know that human error and systemic problems will be
handled without blame. Your policies should reinforce a Just Culture that
distinguishes between human error and violation of rules. If they feed a
culture of fear of reprisal it will impede the adoption of your SMS.
• Define the chain of command that a safety report will follow. This ensures
transparency in the process, which enhances Reporting Culture. It also
ensures the report is shared within the organization or escalated to the next
higher authority as appropriate.
Safety Risk Management
• Develop a written risk management plan and ensure there is a mechanism
by which risks are communicated to employees. Set a continuous feedback
loop that identifies problem indicators and define roles and responsibilities
that identify who is to act on problem indicators, so your organization can
address problems quickly.
Safety Assurance
• Data is dependent on Reporting Culture and directly contributes to Informed
Culture. Metrics can serve as a driving force that has enormous effects on
an organization, as illustrated by Alcoa’s transformation (Duhigg, 2012).
Data can also help teams combat Groupthink, check assumptions, and
approach debates with clarity and well-thought-out rationale. Start by
identifying the key metrics of success that drive your organization’s
problem indicators and results. Develop systems that capture data about
your organization’s performance and establish a mechanism for continued
refinement of these systems over time. Establish efficient systems that allow
employees to request or share data which can be used for decision-making.
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•

Management controls allow management to reinforce Safety Culture
without being present. However, as the Hawthorne study (Florczak, 2003)
suggests, leadership must also be present, engaged, and attentive, and must
invite dialogue and build trust.
Safety Promotion
• If your high-risk organization is hierarchical in nature, ensure management
is especially conscious (and public) about valuing and approving of
creativity in your enterprise.
• Training is an opportunity to teach new and existing employees how to do
their job safely and reinforces both Safety Culture and Psychological
Safety. Employees must feel safe learning and failing during training, and
it must be clear during training that you value a Learning Culture not only
during training but also in the course of their work.
• Training must reinforce Just Culture by including the following key
takeaways: (1) yours is an environment that is truth-seeking, not egofeeding, as demonstrated by Shahinpoor and Matt (2007); (2) in your
organization, as at Jobs’ Apple (Scott, 2017a, 2017b), there is an obligation
to dissent; (3) among your teams there is not a lack of respect, but rather an
absence of deference; and (4) everyone is welcome to speak their
conscience, and all dissenting opinions are heard.
• Understand that how your organization responds to Pricinpled Dissent is far
more impactful than how it claims to respond (Kassing, 2011). Remember
that dissent it is not an expression of criticism (Shahinpoor & Matt, 2007),
but rather an expression of conscience, and ensure the entire management
chain treats it as such.
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